It is widely known that early on in his teaching career Karl Barth advanced a concept of the 'orders of creation', but that he retracted that concept in his later work in reaction to the tragic use that had been made of it by the National Socialist movement in Germany. However, two aspects of this movement remain relatively unexplored: first, the underlying material continuity between Barth's early ethics and his later ethics that this movement occludes; and second, the significant methodological shift in Barth's theology which this movement attests. This article explores both these aspects of Barth's theological development through his treatment of the 'orders of creation'.
In 1928-9 (in Münster) and in 1930-1 (in Bonn), Karl Barth delivered a series of lectures on ethics. On both occasions, Barth espouses a theology which contains a concept of 'orders of creation'. He asserts that there exist: orders of creation, i.e., orders that come directly into question (and more than that) with the fact of our life itself as representatives of the order, as a creaturely standard and basis of knowledge of the will of the Creator, as words which we cannot possibly overlook in obedience to the Word because they are set on our lips and in our hearts with our life as direct testimonies to the Word. 1 In 1951, however, when Barth wrote volume III/4 of the Church Dogmatics, on the ethics of creation, he describes as unsatisfactory a theology which posits the existence of an 'order or many orders of creation, which create a sort of basis, sphere or framework for the real divine commanding to be extracted from God's particular revelation'.
2 Indeed, so far did Barth move from the idea of 'orders of creation' that he refused to allow the Ethics to be published in his lifetime. 3 The question therefore arises as to what changed at this point in the theology of Barth between the Ethics of 1928 and the Church Dogmatics of 1951. This question is relevant not only in terms of tracing the historical development of Barth's ethics during a critical period in European history, but also for the light it sheds on the wider matter of how to construe the relationship between Christian ethics and the sphere of creation. To investigate this issue, this article proceeds in two stages. First, it examines the criticisms of the 'orders of creation' that Barth makes in the Church Dogmatics, and explores their relevance to the concept of the 'orders of creation' that he himself advanced in the Ethics. Second, this article considers what developments, beyond mere terminology, have taken place in Barth's ethics at this point between the Ethics and the Church Dogmatics.
An underlying continuity in Barth's ethics of creation
In order to assess the continuity of Barth in his ethics of creation, it is instructive first to examine the criticisms of the 'orders of creation' that Barth makes in the Church Dogmatics, and to explore their relevance to his own concept of the 'orders of creation' advanced in the Ethics. In the Church Dogmatics, Barth offers three closely related grounds for rejecting the concept of 'orders of creation'. The first ground is that the concept of 'orders of creation' is ethically unsatisfactory: it implies that ethical certainty can be attained through these 'orders' even in abstraction from the revealed Word of God. 4 The second ground is that the concept of 'orders of creation' is theologically unsatisfactory: it suggests that the 'orders of creation' are separate from the command of God the Redeemer, and thereby splits not only the one command of God but ultimately the concept of God itself. 5 The third ground is that the concept of 'orders of creation' is epistemologically unsatisfactory: it infers that the 'orders of creation' are divorced from the true Creator-creature relationship, from faith and from revelation. 
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The question arises as to what extent these three related criticisms meet Barth's own construal of the 'orders of creation' in the Ethics.
In respect of the first criticism -the lack of ethical certainty -already in the Ethics, Barth acknowledges in respect of the 'orders' under which he stands that '[W]hether they are order or merely apparent order may be asked of all orders that are not directly the order, that are not finally God himself or direct witness to him'. 7 And therefore even if the ethical agent had perfect knowledge of all the orders, 'we still could not speak any final word about what is good or bad, since the order is not coincident with the totality of the orders'.
8 Meanwhile, pre-empting the risk of an abstraction from the Word of God, Barth stresses that the orders of creation are 'primal words which at all events proclaim God's own Word '. 9 In respect of the second criticism -the division in the command of God -Barth notes already in the Ethics that it is 'inadvisable . . . to construct an antithesis between the command of the Creator and the command of Christ'.
10 By contrast, Barth declares, '[I]n Christ we have to do with the Creator and in the Creator we have to do with Christ'.
11 This reflects the fact that 'God . . . is one, the one, and among all the possible determinations of our will it can be said only of that which comes from him that it is uniform and unequivocal'. 12 Finally, in respect of the third criticism -the abstraction from the revelation of and the relationship with God -Barth stresses the importance of the 7 Ethics, p. 213. 8 14 He posits that, within the order of creation, ' [W] hat is commanded us is and will be established by him who commands here, and no general moral truth, no matter where it comes from, must intervene between him and us'. 15 Consequently, Barth notes that the claim of the command of God is one of right because 'we belong to him who commands from the very first'. 16 On each point of the threefold criticism of the 'orders of creation' in the Church Dogmatics, then, the earlier lectures of the Ethics appear to emerge unscathed. The 'orders of creation' advanced there do not offer certainty in ethical decision; are not present without the Word of God in Jesus Christ; and are not abstracted from the relationship between God and the ethical agent, the event of the revelation of the former or the faith of the latter. Despite Barth formally dropping the language of the 'orders of creation', an important continuity in terms of Barth's construal of the command of God the Creator remains apparent.
The real opposition of Barth in the Church Dogmatics on each point seems rather to be aimed at the concept of the 'orders of creation' posited by Emil Brunner in his book The Divine Imperative. 17 There, Brunner confidently describes the 'orders of creation' as 'concrete instructions to work, given by the Creator God to the individual human being'. 18 Then, although Brunner agrees that God the Creator and God the Redeemer are the same, he nevertheless writes that '[A]s Redeemer He can only work where His Word is heard, that is, in faith. As Creator and Preserver He works even where men do not know Him at all'. 19 Finally, Brunner suggests that the orders of creation are 'the subject of a purely rational knowledge', 20 something in which '[E]ven a man who does not know God perceives . . . something of 13 Ibid., p. 210, emphasis added. 14 Ibid., p. 214. 15 Ibid., p. 119. Barth thus acknowledges that the very givenness of the divine command leads to a strong relativization of theological ethics in general and of the 'orders' in particular, noting that, 'we can point with absolute stringency to no orders to which our acts are always good when bound and always bad when not bound', ibid., p. 214. Barth is therefore aware, even at the time of the Ethics, of the limitations of the discipline of theological ethics, particularly in view of the 'orders of creation', and consequently disputes Gogarten's view of the concrete givenness of the 'orders', 
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It may well be asked in passing why Barth adopted the concept of the 'orders of creation' in the Ethics in the first place, when the meaning he assigned to it clearly differed so radically from that of his contemporaries such as Brunner. After all, Barth had both preached and lectured against the 'orders of creation' many years before the Ethics. 23 25 Nevertheless, as the explicit dropping of the term 'orders of creation' indicates, important developments have taken place in Barth's theological ethics between the Ethics and the Church Dogmatics. This section will look at three developments in particular: first, the shift in the way in which the word 'order' is used; second, the change in the material content of the 'order of creation'; and finally, the alteration in the methodology by which the content of the 'order of creation' is derived.
A change in the emphasis on 'order'
In the Ethics, the word 'order' is used as the title for the section in which Barth deals with the content of the Word of God as the Creator, 26 and there is frequent reference to the 'orders of creation ', 27 and to the 'order of creation'. 28 In the Church Dogmatics, however, the word 'order' no longer forms part of any heading in the ethics of creation. And, as noted above, Barth rejects entirely the concept of 'orders of creation' in the Church Dogmatics, and the terms an 'order of creation' in the singular and the 'orders of creation' in the plural are therefore generally eschewed. Moreover, where Barth does introduce the concept of 'order' in the Church Dogmatics, in the context of the one 'order of creation', he is explicitly more cautious than in the Ethics. Barth writes that the spheres of creation, reconciliation and redemption, within which the ethical encounter takes place, might very well be called orders (Ordnungen), however there would then exist the permanent possibility of 'misunderstanding them as laws, prescriptions and imperatives'. 30 Hence he states in respect of the phrase 'the order of creation' that:
The distinction between this order and what is customarily called 'order of creation' elsewhere is clear and irreconcilable. To be aware of this order we do not leave the closed circle of theological knowledge. We do not in some way read off this order where we just think we find it. We do not understand it at all as an order which can be discovered by us. 31 to be completely absent. However, despite these formal regressions in vocabulary, the context of these 'exceptions' seems to offer evidence that, even here, Barth's underlying thinking remains broadly consistent. In the first case, in CD III/1, Barth highlights that 'all that he [Paul] had to say about man and woman was seen . . . in the light of the relationship between Jesus Christ and His community, and therefore of His divine likeness, and . . . it is only in this way that it is presented as an "order of creation"', CD III/1, p. 205. In the second case, in CD III/4, Barth notes that in the case of these 'orders', 'we are concerned with an irremovable confrontation clearly confirmed by the command of God as such', CD III/4, pp. 301-2. Thus the context of these 'exceptions' still indicates precisely the revelational, Christocentric and relational view of the command of God which Barth extols elsewhere in the Church Dogmatics. Herein, then, lies the part-truth in Nigel Biggar's statement that 'if the concept of an order of creation is to have "serious theological content", it must denote the proper relationship between Creator and human creature', The Hastening that Waits (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 57, quoting CD III/4, p. 38, although Biggar fails to convey and perhaps even misrepresents the subjunctive and thus hypothetical mood of the original German text. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that Barth's use of these terms remains unwise, unhelpful and inconsistent.
It should be noted in passing that Barth had earlier argued on the basis of his exegesis of Paul that Paul did not regard this gender hierarchy 'as an "order of creation", but only -which is rather different -as a divine ordinance valid in the sphere of the Fall', CD I/2, p. 194, as a result of which 'both step out of a relationship in which there is no word at all of super-or sub-ordination', CD I/2, p. 194. This passage, however, is explicitly contradicted by Barth later in the Church Dogmatics, when he writes that '[T]he determination and limitation of the relationship of man and woman as established in Christ emerge already in the work of creation', CD III/2, p. 311. The reason for this shift is perhaps to be found in the revision of the doctrine of election which Barth undertook after CD I/2 -about which more below. 30 Nevertheless, it should be noted that Barth not only allows that the phrase the 'order of creation' might be legitimately used to describe the first of these three spheres of ethical enquiry, but indeed he also uses the phrase and its equivalents in precisely this way in the Church Dogmatics. 32 Moreover, in parallel fashion, Barth also uses the phrase 'order of reconciliation' and its equivalents to describe the second of these spheres of ethical enquiry in the Church Dogmatics. 33 While there do not appear to be any explicit references in the extant Church Dogmatics to the 'order of redemption', clearly such a reference would be both possible for Barth and thoroughly consistent. 34 With this analysis in view, it can be seen that Nigel Biggar is right to observe that 'the change that took place in Barth's thinking between 1928 and 1951 was not the jettisoning of the concept of created order as such', 35 but wrong at least in part to suggest that the change was 'a change in the form of that concept, combined with a refusal to call it by its usual name'. 36 Barth's depiction of the one 'order of creation' -as one of the three spheres of encounter between God and the human -did not change either in form or in name, being used in both the Ethics and the Church Dogmatics to describe the relationship between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless, on balance it seems fair to conclude with Timothy J. Gorringe that the later Barth 'became much more reticent about the concept of "order"'. 37 A change in the content of the 'order of creation'
There is a clear change in the material content assigned to the 'order of creation' in the Church Dogmatics as compared to the Ethics. In Ethics, the 'order of creation' is filled out by the themes of work, marriage, family and equality/leadership, which together are explicitly described as the 'orders of creation'.
38 By contrast, in the Church Dogmatics, the ethics of creation is unfolded along four lines which correspond to the four aspects of Barth's theological anthropology. In this anthropology, the ethical agent is conceived as a being in relation with God; a being in relation with fellow humanity; a being in the unity of soul and body; and a being in (limited) time. 39 Correspondingly, the ethics of the 'order of creation', which are described under the rubric of 'freedom', appear under the headings of freedom before God; freedom in fellowship; freedom for life; and freedom in limitation.
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A change in methodology for the 'order of creation'
Beyond these two shifts in the emphasis on 'order' and the content of the 'order of creation' there lies a far more fundamental shift which occurs between the Ethics and the Church Dogmatics at this point. The key change lies in Barth's methodological move to a theology grounded far more explicitly in Christology, not only in theory but also in practice: not only noetically but also ontically. This methodology emerged in its fullness only after 1936, when Barth recast his doctrine of election Christocentrically. 41 In terms of ethics, it leads to the command of God in each sphere of ethical encounter between God and humanity -including the sphere of creation -being construed in a more definitely Christocentric manner. 43 The unfolding of anthropology therefore takes place in Barth under the theological presupposition that 'we are invited to infer from His human nature the character of our own, to know ourselves in Him, but in Him really to know ourselves'. 44 Thus these four lines are not categories read from reality or the creation per se, but are lines of the constitution and relationality of human being as exclusively determined in and by the person of Jesus Christ revealed in scripture. 45 This development in Barth is clearly highlighted by his treatment of the ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer at this point. Bonhoeffer elucidates a number of 'mandates' in which the 'relation of the world to Christ becomes concrete'. 46 These 'mandates' are for Bonhoeffer divine 'only because of their original and final relation to Christ'. 47 They have the character of 'the divinely imposed task as opposed to that of a determination of being'. 48 By contrast, in the Church Dogmatics, the aspects of the order of creation which Barth sketches out amount explicitly and precisely to a determination of the being of the ethical agent in Jesus Christ. This Christological concentration is clearly in evidence when Barth outlines the legitimate use of the term 'order of creation' to describe the particular sphere of divine command and human action in which on the one side the God who is gracious to man in Jesus Christ commands also as Creator, and on the other the man to whom God is gracious in Jesus Christ stands before Him also as His creature. 49 Thus while Biggar is right to note that, in Barth, the 'exposition of the command of God the Creator is based upon the created relational structure of the human creature', 50 this is only true in respect of the relational structure of the human creature as revealed and known in Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is not only the noetic, but also the ontic, ground of the order of creation. This, then, is the key development between the Ethics and the Church Dogmatics: that the ethics of creation is no longer governed by a Christological methodology only in form, but also in content.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that there exists a notable underlying material continuity between the Ethics and the Church Dogmatics in terms of Barth's view of the 'orders of creation'. It has also recognized the profound shift in his understanding of the 'order of creation' which occurs between the Ethics and the Church Dogmatics, and has argued that this development can be traced primarily to the Christocentric shift in Barth's understanding of the doctrine of election in the intervening period.
If Barth had banned the Ethics from publication during his lifetime on account of this Christological shift alone, then clearly most of Barth's work pre-1936 would have been destined for similar treatment and neglect. The real reason for this strong reaction far more probably lies in the abuse of the concept of 'orders of creation' in inter-war Germany, and its immeasurable consequences. 51 Barth witnessed both at close hand, and it would not do to underestimate the impact these events had on Barth both as a theologian and as a human being.
With the posthumous publication of the Ethics, however, it can be seen that there is both important continuity and significant development between the Ethics and the Church Dogmatics. The continuity in terms of Barth's actualistic and dialectic approach to a Christian ethics centred on the command of God is clear. But it is the shift to a more practically Christocentric moral ontology that allows Barth to move to develop his special ethics with power and theological consistency. It is this shift which the change in Barth's view of the 'orders of creation' clearly attests, and to which this article has attempted to draw attention. 
